Introduction
By examining the history of Mexico, namely the
recollection of the Tlatelolco massacre on October 2, 1968, it is evident that
there is a disparity in the interpretation of the event. This disparity is
observed between the citizens of Mexico that were involved in the Tlatelolco
massacre, and the historical accounts and claims of the Mexican government. Some
would argue that the government of Mexico responded reasonably and legitimately
to student protests in 1968 by reverting to violence, which resulted in the Tlatelolco
massacre. However, I argue that the violence of the Tlatelolco massacre cannot
be considered justified violence by the state; furthermore, the violence cannot
be considered a successful political action that preserved the stability of the
state. Moreover, I argue that the violence was a direct result of the state’s switch
from a defensive to an offensive position regarding the student protests. This article
will contend various arguments that justify the government’s violent actions, as
well as delineate the government’s switch from a defensive to an offensive position.
Finally, this article will contend the dual moral standard of the government of
Mexico in light of the Tlatelolco massacre.
Reasons for Arguing
that Tlatelolco Violence was Justified
Some would argue that the violence of the Tlatelolco
massacre was a successful political action that was accomplished by the repressive
measures of the Mexican government. The National Security Archive’s electronic
briefing book on the Tlatelolco massacre discloses some of the undesirable behaviour
of the student protesters, such as “interfering with traffic, seizing busses
and haranguing workers,”[i]
as well as the government’s assumption that the public opinion toward the
student movement was negative. However, despite the potential disruption the
student protesters may have caused, it is important to recognize why students
were protesting. Burton Kirkwood highlights that students were dissatisfied with the
leadership of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), by virtue that members of the PRI “looked to the government as a means to
deliver personal wealth and serve political ambitions” [ii].
Student protestors were exasperated at the financial decisions made by the PRI
to continuously fund the upcoming Olympic Games, instead of funding services
and internal projects to improve the condition of Mexican citizens[iii].
The state of Mexico in the post war period, namely the 1960’s, was
defined by the negligence of economic and social duties of the PRI for the
citizens of Mexico[iv]. The
government refused to acknowledge the ways in which is was mistreating Mexican
citizens, and therefore made false assumptions regarding public opinion towards
the student protestors. By attributing undesirable behaviour to student
protestors only, the government assumed that violent measures were justifiable.
Image retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/the-tlatelolco-massacre-2136127
From Defensive to
Offense – The Mexican Government’s Tactics
Regarding the student protests of 1968, the Mexican
government switched from a defensive position, to an offensive position, which
resulted in the violence of the Tlatelolco massacre. A telegram entitled “Student
Disorders,” highlights the Gustavo Diaz Ordaz government’s “hands off approach”[v]
with regard to the student protests. This document delineates that behind the
scenes, government officials were working to “divide and weaken support of extremist strike
leaders,” but it was not done in public. A student protest was held on
August 27, and this document highlights that the Ordaz government tolerated student
protests, considering it “permitted [students] to direct an unprecedented level of public
criticism”[vi]. The Mexican government
assumed that the passion and ambition of students would change and weaken over
time.
The government of Mexico repressed student protests with minor
attacks leading up to the October 2nd massacre[vii].
Government attacks, undertaken by the granaderos, were witnessed throughout
July and August of 1968[viii];
however, in September of 1968, the government replaced their defensive strategy,
with an offensive approach. A telegram from the U.S Embassy in Mexico City outlined that
military commanders were given authority to “move against student protesters in the
provinces without checking with the central government”[ix].
This telegram was sent a day before the Tlatelolco massacre, and it delineates
that authority was given to
the military zone commanders to move in on students[x].
Evidently, adopting an offensive position and granting authority to the
granaderos, resulted in a gruesome massacre which left many Mexican citizens
heartbroken and bewildered.
Image retrieved from http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc18.pdf
Why the
Tlatelolco violence cannot be Justified
An action which is completed with a legitimate, and
often morally good reason, is considered justifiable. When an action is
justifiable, details concerning the action are often transparent and specifics
can be discussed openly. Due to the obscure nature of various details
surrounding the Tlatelolco massacre, the argument that the massacre violence
was justifiable, is weak. P.J. Brendese underscores that there have been several attempts to hold political leaders
responsible for the violence of the Tlatelolco massacre; however, these
attempts to prosecute have failed[xi].
Leaders who have been accused of ordering the Tlatelolco assault, such as Luis Echeverría (who was second in command to President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz), have
refused to openly discuss issues regarding the massacre. If the primary aim of
the Tlatelolco massacre indeed was to
preserve order, and was for the good
of the Mexican people, political leaders are still unwilling to own the actions
they took.
Media Censorship
Victoria Carpenter emphasizes
that information regarding the events of October 2nd, 1968 was covered up
through media blackouts, and citizens were not permitted to question the
information that was allowed to circulate[xii].
Student protestors were faced with the decision to comply with the censorship regulations
or face serious danger and aggression from the state. Claire Brewster confirms that
the Mexico’s
authoritarian government intended to stop anti-government opinions circulating
the media[xiii];
furthermore, Carpenter emphasizes
that military documents regarding the massacre have yet to be available to the
public.[xiv]
Death Toll
In addition to the ambiguous and limited circulation
of information, the official death toll of the Tlatelolco massacre is
inconsistent with numbers reported by eye-witnesses. A telegram from the U.S.
Embassy in Mexico, entitled
“October 2 Riots”, reports that 24 civilian and 8 army men were found
dead, and the possibility of 100 injured. This death and injury count is
significantly lower than those of eye witness accounts, which accounts for over
300 dead[xv].
However, due to a lack of concrete evidence, the official death toll of the
Tlatelolco massacre stays at 44 men and women[xvi]
 |
| Image retrieved from http://etincelle-revolution.over-blog.fr/article-un- monde-de-fous-1968-le-massacre-de-tlatelolco-125228565.html |
Conclusion
The Tlatelolco massacre cannot be considered justified violence by the state due to the lack of transparency and openness in discussions surrounding the event. This ambiguity is witnessed by the media censorship enforced by the government of Mexico, as well as disparities in death toll numbers and the unwillingness of political leaders to confess their actions. Furthermore, a distinct shift from a defensive to an offensive position by the government of Mexico directly correlates
with the violence of
the Tlatelolco massacre. State stability was not maintained, which is apparent
in various forms of literature after the massacre in 1968, as well as street
demonstrations and marches. Ultimately, the citizens of Mexico experienced the
pain of loss. The loss of loved ones, trust in their governing system, and the loss
of their voices and ability to question due to censorship. Many answers remain hidden
regarding the details of the massacre; however, the sorrow remains apparent.
This sorrow cannot be buried under the notion of justified violence.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc12.pdf
(accessed February 23, 2017).
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Company, 1960), 131-155.
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(accessed February 23,
2017)
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February 23, 2017)
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc18.pdf (accessed
February 23, 2017)
[xi] P.J. Brendese,
"Remembering Democratic Time: Specters of Mexico's Past and Democracy's
Future," Polity 41 (2009): 436-64
[xii] Victoria Carpenter, “The Echo of Tlatelolco in Contemporary Mexican Protest
Poetry," Bulletin of Latin American
Research 24 (2005): 496
[xiii] Claire Brewster, “The Student Movement of 1968 and the Mexican Press: The
Cases of
"Excélsior" and "Siempre"!" Bulletin of Latin American Research
21 (2002): 173
[xiv] Victoria Carpenter, “The Echo of Tlatelolco in Contemporary Mexican Protest
Poetry," Bulletin of Latin American
Research 24 (2005): 496-512
[xv] John Rodda, “How
the Guardian reported Mexico City's Tlatelolco massacre of 1968,” October
5, 1968, https://www.theguardian.com/cities/from-the-archive-
blog/2015/nov/12/guardian-mexico-tlatelolco-massacre-1968-john-rodda
(accessed
March 29, 2017)
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB99/Doc10.pdf
(accessed February 23,
2017): 1
[xvii] Victoria Carpenter, “The Echo of Tlatelolco in Contemporary Mexican Protest
Poetry," Bulletin of Latin American
Research 24 (2005): 496-512
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